
A priori is the problematic side of
this pairing. Determining what constitutes a priori knowledge depends on the
assumptions one begins with. Knowledge can be said to be a priori if it is
independent of a particular experience (e.g., I know that if I drop a stone it
will fall) or if it precedes any experience (this is the concept of INNATE
IDEAS). Similarly, some hold that certain statements in LOGIC and mathematics
are a priori (or analytic, see further),
since they depend only on the laws of their discipline; but others insist that
those rules presuppose the truth of the axioms that support them.
Parallel to the a priori / a
posteriori distinction is that between analytic andsynthetic judgments- the
difference, in effect, between statements whose truth depends purely on the
meaning of their terms ("Are bachelors are unmarried", "2 + 2 =
4") and those that require outside evidence to determine their truth or
falsity ("All bachelors live alone", "Two of my children are
girls and two are boys") Analytic judgment are a priori because they do
not depend on experience; however, since they tell us nothing new, they are of
no practical use. The absolute distinction between analytic and synthetic
statements has lately been questioned, especially by the American philosopher
Willard van Orman Quine, who argues that since the definitions of words are
changeable, imprecise, and disputed, the "synonymy" required to make
a true analytic statement may be impossible to achieve.
See also DEDUCTION and INDUCTION; KANT
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